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e history of concepts is relevant in philosophy because conceptual distinctions
fundamentally shape cognition. Because these conceptual distinctions are deeply
entrenched in our way of thinking, we are not usually aware of this inuence. How
we view the world depends crucially on the concepts we have. ese concepts,
however, are the products of their history. Following Herbart, Gustav Teichmüller
viewed philosophy as the systematic analysis and renement of concepts. Ren-
ing concepts in such a way allows us to make new distinctions, or to transform or
abandon old ones. In contrast to Herbart, Teichmüller emphasized that this process
presupposes detailed historical studies. is does not mean, however, that Teich-
müller embraced a kind of historicism—the view that philosophy and its history are
one and the same thing. On the contrary, he derogatorily referred to such a view as
“historical psychology.” Rather, the history of concepts in Teichmüller’s sense has to
be understood as a history of problems which are reected in conceptual distinc-
tions. is means that the history of concepts, which brings to light explicit and
implicit distinctions, can be applied as a kind of hermeneutics of world views—as
the basis on which we can systematically reconstruct concepts in a new light. It
is the aim of this presentation to unfold such an understanding of the history of
concepts in view of Teichmüller’s contribution to it.
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e philosopher Gustav Teichmüller (who was born in 1832) held the chair
of philosophy at the University of Tartu (Dorpat) from 1871 until his early
death in 1888. He was one of the rst to systematically study the history of
concepts. rough this interest, he paved the way for what was to become
the most comprehensive representation of the history of concepts to date:
theHistorisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (Historical Dictionary of Philos-
ophy, 13 volumes), a project which was begun in 1971 and completed in 2007.
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It is my aim here to lay out the signicance of the history of concepts for
philosophy, in order then (in the second part of my considerations) to give
credit to Teichmüller’s contributions to the theory and praxis of the study of
the history of concepts.1
e term ‘history of concepts’ is itself not without problems. Strictly
speaking, concepts do not have a history. As the logician Gottlob Frege ac-
curately noted, “What is usually called the history of concepts is in fact either
a history of our cognition of these concepts or a history of the meaning of
words” (Frege 1884, vii). In this passage, Frege tacitly refers to his Jena col-
league Rudolf Eucken. (Eucken and Gustav Teichmüller were both strongly
inuenced by Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, who was the rst to demand
an investigation of the history of concepts.)2 However, Eucken more cau-
tiously speaks of the “history of philosophical terminology,” thus already
meeting Frege’s concerns. Terminologies, of course, do have a history: we
canmake out at which point in time a certain term (denoting a specic con-
cept or conceptual distinction) came into use. Insofar as we are concerned
with conceptual distinctions, we are justied in speaking of their history.
is is because distinctions, in contrast to dierences, are made, i.e. they are
drawn, altered, specied, and given up in time—that is to say, at a specic
time. In this sense, the history of concepts is really a history of conceptual
distinctions and denitions.
e signicance of the history of concepts for philosophy is sometimes
overestimated; however, it is also commonly underestimated. It is overesti-
mated when philosophy and its history are equated. Philosophy as a think-
ing in concepts is then identied with the history of philosophical concepts.
Against this view, we shouldmaintain that philosophy is not a historical, but
a systematic discipline. However, this should not be taken to mean that we
can practice philosophy by completely disregarding its history. On the other
hand, the signicance of the history of concepts is oen underestimated be-
cause the role conceptual distinctions play in cognition is underestimated.
Cognition is commonly understood in terms of propositions. It is proposi-
tions, statements, judgments, and assertions to which truth and falsity have
been ascribed ever since Aristotle, through Kant and Frege, up until mod-
ern logic and philosophy of science. On this view, the concept of cognition
is closely tied to the concept of truth, and cognition is hence limited to a
1 A short appraisal of these contributions can be found in (Meier 1971); for Teichmüller,
see in particular pp. 802–804. More generally for Teichmüller, see Heiner Schwenke’s
monograph (2006) and the article ““A Star of the First Magnitude within the Philosophical
World”—Introduction to Life and Work of Gustav Teichmüller” in the present volume.
2 Concerning Trendelenburg’s, Teichmüller’s and Eucken’s impact on the history of concepts
cf. (Hühn 2009).
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propositional understanding of knowledge. (I cannot go into a critique of
this problematic restriction of cognition to propositional knowledge here.)
However, denitions are not propositional statements, but rather normative
determinations of the use of expressions. Although they may grammatically
be treated as statements, logically or semantically, they clearly form a distinct
class. Even in cases where denitions take into account existing or earlier
uses of a word, they still cannot be ascribed a truth value. For this reason,
they are denied all cognitive value, in line with the propositional concept of
knowledge.
Such a view is carried to the extreme when it turns into the thesis of the
arbitrariness of denitions. According to this thesis, denitions are merely
arbitrary stipulations of the use of a sign that only serve the purpose of
economy—or at least that is what they should ideally be. e origins of the
arbitrariness thesis can be traced back toHobbes and Pascal, but it has found
especially many adherents within modern logic and philosophy of mathe-
matics, in which formal systems play an important role. I believe that this
thesis is mistaken at its very core. It is not even true of formal languages,
much less in other contexts. Of course, itmay happen that an arbitrarily cho-
sen sign is introduced as an abbreviation of a more complex one. However,
this is clearly not what typically happens in denitions. As an example, con-
sider the calculus of propositional logic. It is possible to dene one logical
connective through others (with the help of the negation).e knowledge of
this possibility is a deep logical insight and these denitions are certainly not
arbitrary, except in the sense that the choice of logical symbols is arbitrary,
i.e. conventional.e relevant equations of meaning, however, are not at all
arbitrary; and hence, the denitions are by no means merely arbitrary stip-
ulations. Rather, they should be considered explications which provide us
with an insight into the logical structure underlying our language. As such,
these denitions are subject to criteria of adequacy. ey seem arbitrary
only as long as we articially pretend to be concerned with mere symbols
of formal languages. As soon as we assign a meaning to these symbols (and
without such a meaning, formal languages are without relevance), there is
no longer any appearance of arbitrariness. In fact, even formal languages are
not constructed arbitrarily, but rather with possible interpretations in mind.
In other words: a strict separation between syntax and semantics is possible
only for practical purposes, but not in principle.
Now, let us consider entries in dictionaries concerned with the history
of concepts. What we have here are descriptive diagnoses about language
use and concept formations, i.e. true or false statements. If we want to speak
of denitions at all here, we should distinguish them as lexical denitions
from normative denitions. What such lexical denitions in historical dic-
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tionaries describe, however, are oen the normative determinations of other
authors. ese are normative at least in the sense that they do not take into
account all aspects of themeaning of a given term: with a view to the respec-
tive aim, some aspects are emphasized while others are eliminated. Deni-
tions change the way concepts are used. Because the use of words stands for
distinctions, denitions intervene in our structuring of the world.is also
explains the existence of the so-called mere “verbal dispute,” which is oen
unjustly condemned. In many cases, what is argued about here are not mere
words, but the linguistic and hence the conceptual structuring of the world.
Accordingly, the denitions that are relevant are not mere linguistic ab-
breviations. Rather, they must be regarded as reconstructive explications
which structure our conceptions in a new way. is already happens in the
conguration of the deniens, in concept formation. In this process, con-
cepts are not only formed through explicit denitions, but also and more
importantly when new understandings arise gradually and tacitly. Deni-
tions are simply the place where the will to structure concepts in a new
way becomes most apparent. In particular, the most fundamental insights,
which shape our understanding of the world, become manifest in distinc-
tions. Without these distinctions, it is impossible to think propositional
knowledge: they form the categorical framework that makes our claims to
propositional knowledge possible. If we ascribe distinctions the merely pre-
liminary role of paving the way for “real”, i.e., propositional knowledge, then
we disguise a more adequate understanding of the epistemic role of these
distinctions. On closer inspection, we nd that oen the reverse relation
holds between propositions and denitions: propositions are true or false
depending on the distinctions drawn in advance. is insight is not with-
out consequences, in particular for philosophy as a thinking in concepts, a
discipline which is neither concerned with formal deductions nor with em-
pirical verication. In philosophy, cognition essentially takes place through
categorical distinctions. Philosophical cognition even consists in cognition
of distinctions, as Plato’s dialogues already conrm. We should therefore be
careful not to overemphasize the apophantic character of philosophy. True,
philosophy is concerned with justications. However, it is not so much the
truth of statements that is justied, but rather the adequacy of distinctions.
Philosophical statements about the essence of something are, in most cases,
denitions of that essence in disguise. ese denitions, in turn, represent
normative distinctions.
In sum, philosophical discourse consists not somuch in the justication
(and critique) of propositional statements (or assertions), but rather in the
justication (and critique) of categorical distinctions. It follows that the his-
tory of concepts plays an important role in providing a reliable hermeneutic
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foundation for philosophical discourse. In the vast majority of cases, ba-
sic insights amount to seeing (or making others see) things dierently ‘in
the light of ’ new distinctions which open up a new perspective.e insight
into distinctions can—in a similar way to the perception of gestalts—reverse
our entire perspective on something. is is not only true of philosophy,
which is permanently concerned with categorical explications, but also of
the sciences. For example, T. S. Kuhn presumes that all scientic revolu-
tions have been reected in a new understanding of old terms (Kuhn 1996,
198). Hence, the so-called paradigm changes always involve modications
of themost fundamental conceptual distinctions.e history of the sciences
has thus proved a fruitful area of application for the history of concepts as
a history of problems. In this context we should remember that while ev-
eryday language and philosophical terms are authorities we need to respect,
we should also take care (as with all authorities) not to follow them blindly.
Accordingly, the history of concepts and the history of problems are not op-
ponents, as is oen claimed. On the contrary, the two work hand in hand
and complement each other. We can nd indications of such a view already
in Teichmüller—which leads me to the second part of my considerations.
Because to Teichmüller “philosophy consists solely in concepts,” he ul-
timately understands the discipline in the sense of the philosopher Johann
Friedrich Herbart as the systematic “analysis and renement of concepts”
(Herbart 1813, §1). But, in contrast to Herbart, Teichmüller emphasized that
this process presupposes detailed historical studies, in which the distinc-
tions to be rened are rst of all unfolded in their historical development
(Teichmüller 1874, ii–ix).3 e “history of concepts” identies the “motifs of
each theory and the courses which each concept has subjected to its rule, but
also the collisions with other truths and the dismissal of misplaced claims to
power” (Teichmüller 1874, iii).4 With reference to Trendelenburg, Teich-
müller explicitly rejects the attempt to “merge philosophy with cultural his-
tory and national literature” (Teichmüller 1876, vi). It is thus clear that al-
though Teichmüller is, at rst glance, concerned with authors, with the great
“names of philosophy,” what he really wants is to solve systematic philosoph-
ical problems. Hence, his history of concepts concentrates on the history of
problems. We are justied in counting Teichmüller among the founders of
the study of the history of concepts—but it also has to be emphasized that
he does not embrace any kind of historicism, the view that philosophy and
its history are one and the same thing. On the contrary, Teichmüller deroga-
torily refers to such a view as “historical psychology” (Teichmüller 1876, v).
3 Reprint (1966, v–xi; for some absurd reason, the Roman pagination has been altered in the
reprint). Cf. (Dyro 1940, xivf).
4 Reprint (1966, v).
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With a view toTeichmüller’s completeworks, itmay seem tempting to regard
him primarily as a historian of philosophy, if only for quantitative reasons.
is impression is reinforced by the fact that his investigations concentrate
mainly on Greek philosophy—at times he explicitly goes back even further
and also includes oriental philosophy. e focus on Greek philosophy in
particular is due to the real history of concepts: “Because our philosophy is
based almost entirely on the Greeks, the main work of the historian has to
be devoted to the origins of our concepts in Greek philosophy” (Teichmüller
1876, vf). Teichmüller believes that if we were to disregard the concepts of
Greek origin, all that would remain would be “a meagre bunch of original
concepts” (Teichmüller 1878, 259). In addition, he criticises the lack of real
understanding of the concepts of Greek origin, which is due to the fact that
they have been taken over “in a rather ambiguous and unclear form” (Teich-
müller 1878, 259). He therefore demands: back to the roots. In this back-
wards movement, Teichmüller is convinced that it will become clear that
much of what seems to be “new discoveries” has in fact already been “proved
or refuted” long ago. (Teichmüller 1878, 260)is quote shows that Teich-
müller’s main interest is not directed at historical beliefs and their genesis as
such. Rather, the issue is to nd an answer to the systematic question of their
validity: beliefs have to be scrutinisedwith regard to their truth or falsehood.
What Teichmüller aims at—in line with Plato—is to turn belief into knowl-
edge, even if this is not always apparent in the details of his individual stud-
ies. is aim clearly distinguishes Teichmüller from the purely historical,
detached representation of Greek philosophy which treats great and small
minds in a similar manner. Such amerely-historical treatment of Greek phi-
losophy can be found, for instance, in Eduard Zeller’s well-known compre-
hensive work Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer historischen Entwicklung
(Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy. Zeller 1856–1868). In Teich-
müller’s view, such a representation leads to the misunderstanding that the
thoughts ofGreek philosophers are part of “a fusty antiquarianworld alien to
us,” which does not deserve any systematic interest (Teichmüller 1878, 258f).
Although Teichmüller’s works concerning the history of concepts make
up by far the greatest part of his publications, his understanding of philos-
ophy is a systematic one, as his chief works Die wirkliche und die scheinbare
Welt (e Real and the Illusionary World) and Religionsphilosophie (Philoso-
phy of Religion) demonstrate.is systematic understanding is concealed by
the facts that such works were published comparatively late and that Teich-
müller did not live long enough to further develop his systematic philos-
ophy.5 I am not here concerned with this part of Teichmüller’s work,6 al-
5 In this context, see (Teichmüller 1889) and (Teichmüller 1940).
6 For a consideration of Teichmüller’s systematic philosophy, see (Schwenke 2006).ere is
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though I should mention that I take a critical stance on its metaphysical ori-
entation, which goes back beyond Kant to Leibniz. But what is more cen-
tral to me here is Teichmüller’s understanding of the history of concepts,
according to which the study of conceptual history is not an end in itself,
but rather serves a preliminary purpose as the “rst condition” for the “ad-
vancement of philosophy” (Teichmüller 1874, iii);7 “for in our contemporary
philosophy, there is still a lot of work to be done, in order tomaster the com-
plex problems of its research more easily through a view of the simple and
transparent motifs of its origins, and in order not to follow paths that lead
into dead ends and whose fruitlessness can be discovered in history” (Teich-
müller 1874, iiif).e historical development of basic philosophical concepts
is thus presented in order to place them within a “topography” for critical
and systematic purposes. Teichmüller even goes so far as to claim that “every
concept, like every point in space, has its place in the general system of con-
cepts, a place which is xed and inevitably determined through denite con-
ditions” (Teichmüller 1886, 16). e notion of a system causes Teichmüller
to explicitly distance himself from the “analysis and renement of concepts”
in Herbart’s sense. He thus emphasizes that it is not possible to “tear a prob-
lem apart from the systems as a whole” (Teichmüller 1874, iv).8 Teichmüller
concentrates on the central concepts; but these, too, rather serve to outline
the paths along which his investigation moves. He did not want to present a
“handbook;” (Teichmüller 1874, vi)9 in its form, his project is committed to
historiography, which always keeps inmind the context of the concepts con-
cerned. Teichmüller was devoted to the goal of producing a “collection of all
philosophical concepts developed so far,” (Teichmüller 1874, vi) in order to
“document the inventory of philosophy.” However, he is still far away from a
historical dictionary of philosophy with its alphabetical order. It was Eucken
who began seriously considering such a project. In line with Trendelenburg,
he stated a “demand for the creation of an encyclopaedia of philosophical ter-
minology” before Teichmüller (Eucken 1872/1873, 81). Both authors, Eucken
and Teichmüller, attest to each other the signicance of a history of concepts
and terminology. For example, Eucken writes in a letter to Teichmüller with
reference to the latter’s Studien zur Geschichte der Begrie (Studies in the His-
tory of Concepts): “I think thewholework concerning the history of concepts
is very fruitful, for it greatly assists the clarity of concepts and therefore also
aids the task of our times.”10 is quote emphasizes once more that the pri-
a new edition of Teichmüller’s systematic works (Teichmüller 2014).
7 Reprint (1966, v).
8 Reprint (1966, vi). Cf. (Teichmüller 1876, x).
9 Reprint (1966, viii).
10 Letter Jena 20.11.1875, in: (Szyłkarski 1940, 426f).
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mary aim of a history of concepts is a systematic one: namely, the clarica-
tion of concepts. Teichmüller, in turn, also recognises Eucken’s Geschichte
der philosophischen Termini im Umriss (Outline of the History of Philosoph-
ical Terminology) for its relevance to the present: “ere is an astonishing
amount of eort put into this, and every new philosopher will have to make
use of it.”11
Even though Teichmüller, in contrast to Eucken, speaks of a history of
concepts rather than of terminology, the two philosophers agree in principle.
is is because Teichmüller is convinced that the formation of concepts and
that of terminology are closely related. With reference to Leibniz, he calls for
the denition of concepts, for the transformation of clear into distinct con-
cepts: “I have always thought that not only the learner, but also the researcher
can only really make any progress when they look for denitions, andmore-
over, when they have mastered them” (Teichmüller 1940, 1). But despite this
systematic position, Teichmüller is not blind to how the philosophical clas-
sics actually apply denitions. For example, he notes that Aristotle, despite
his constant striving to work out a strict terminology, sometimes makes use
of expressions that “are totally foreign to his system and contradict it,” par-
ticularly in passages that are not concerned with the explication of his own
views (Teichmüller 1869, 5). In any case, concepts are intimately linked to
denitions as terminological determinations, or at least with the attempts
at such determinations. Teichmüller’s understanding of concepts, which is
thus tied to terminology, (rightly) leads him to distinguish between concepts
and ideas, and hence also between the history of concepts and the history of
ideas (Teichmüller 1878, 261f).
Concepts are distinct from ideas in that their formation is carried out as
“conscious mental work (Gedankenarbeit).” A history of concepts therefore
presupposes an attempt at terminological determinations on the part of the
authors investigated. Ideas, by contrast, can shape thought even when they
are pre-conceptual or conceptually undetermined, as is the case in religion,
politics, or arts. Accordingly, the history of ideas “has to include mythol-
ogy in the rst place, and then also the whole of cultural history.” e his-
tory of concepts is therefore a subarea of the history of ideas, and is only
concerned with the transformation of ideas into concepts through more or
less precise denitions. Teichmüller emphasizes in this context that philo-
sophical concepts cannot be considered in isolation. Other areas, such as
theology,12 psychology, and the sciences have to be included in the consid-
erations of philosophical concepts.eHistorischesWörterbuch der Philoso-
phie has followed this advice through its extension to all disciplines. In Te-
11 Letter from Teichmüller to Eucken, Dorpat 28.11.78, in: (Szyłkarski 1940, 432).
12 is is represented in particular in (Teichmüller 1873).
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ichmüller’s own works the sciences are taken into account, for instance, in
his investigations of Heraklit’s conceptualisations. Teichmüller notes that
the innovation in his investigation is to show how “physics precedes meta-
physics” (Teichmüller 1876, viii). is approach has been widely accepted,
among others by Hermann Lotze—at the time the most respected German
philosopher. Teichmüller could therefore note: “rough my studies con-
cerning the history of concepts, I came to the conclusion (which, strangely
enough, has to be considered a novel insight) that an understanding of the
metaphysics of the ancients inevitably presupposes an acquaintance with their
physics” (Teichmüller 1878, 273). Another example of how Teichmüller in-
cludes other disciplines in the study of the history of philosophical concepts
is the consideration of anatomy and physiology in his analysis of practical
reason in Aristotle (Teichmüller 1879).13
It is an essential characteristic of Teichmüller’s approach that he follows
the hermeneutic principle of charity, i.e. that he assumes the authors consid-
ered to be rational and consistent.14 e adherence to this principle demon-
strates that Teichmüller’s main interest is directed at the history of problems
with a view to the possibility of a systematic reconstruction of philosophical
concepts. Here, Teichmüller again meets with Lotze’s approval, particularly
concerning his interpretation of Plato’s theory of forms (ideas). Lotze had,
simultaneously with Teichmüller, opposed the traditional interpretation of
the Platonic theory of forms, which ascribes to Plato “the absurd view” that
forms are entities “that exist separate from material things, and yet have
being which resembles that of things” (Lotze 1874, §§317).15 I specically
stress this point because Lotze’s interpretation of Plato in the sense of a the-
ory of validity (as opposed to a theory of being) plays a signicant role in the
reconciliation of Platonismwith Kantianism, which eventually led to a tran-
scendental Platonism in the Southwest School of Neo-Kantianism. Lotze’s
interpretation of the Platonic theory of forms can hence serve us as a good
example of how the history of concepts can be made fruitful for the history
of problems.
As we have seen, Teichmüller stands on the side of concepts historically
as well as systematically. For this reason, he excludes not only the history of
ideas from his considerations, but also the history of metaphors. While the
13 Teichmüller himself noties Eucken that this volume contained his “most signicant stud-
ies and very many surprising new ideas along with familiar material” (Letter Dorpat
17.10.78, in: Szyłkarski 1940, 432). In his answer, Eucken conrms Teichmüller’s principle
according to which the development of the thoughts of philosophers cannot be “consid-
ered in isolation,” but has to be placed in “a wider context” (Letter Jena 4.1.79, Szyłkarski
1940, 433).
14 Cf. (Schwenke 2006, 67).
15 Cf. also (Teichmüller 1878, 263).
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reasons for not considering the history of ideas are of a merely practical na-
ture, the history ofmetaphors is excluded on grounds of principle: according
to Teichmüller, it is better to “eliminate all metaphorical expressions wher-
ever possible” (Teichmüller 1940, 1). With this view, we cannot agree any-
more.16 e most fundamental philosophical distinctions in particular are
oen based on categorical metaphors.erefore, it is a demand of our times
to complement the history of concepts with a history of metaphors. In this
respect, Eucken was more progressive than Teichmüller: alongside a history
of philosophical terminology, he also had in mind a history of philosoph-
ical metaphors. He can thus be regarded as a forerunner of the project of
metaphorology developed byHans Blumenberg (Eucken 1880). Blumenberg
lays claim for his metaphorology to lead us to the “substructure of thought”
(Blumenberg 1998, 13). is, however, already holds true for the history of
conceptual distinctions, insofar as it uncovers the non-propositional sub-
structure of propositional thought.
To summarise the central point of my considerations: Conceptual dis-
tinctions present themselves as pre-propositional cognition which funda-
mentally shapes propositional knowledge. is happens in such a way that
we are not usually aware of it. How we view the world crucially depends on
the concepts we have. is means that the study of the history of concepts,
which brings to light explicit and implicit distinctions, can be applied as a
kind of hermeneutics of world views—as thematerial basis onwhichwe can,
with a view to philosophical problems, systematically reconstruct concepts
in a new light. Gustav Teichmüller has made a fundamental contribution to
such an understanding of the history of concepts.
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